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FORMALITY, NEUTRALITY, AND GOALRATIONALITY: THE LEGACY OF
WEBER IN ANALYZING LEGAL
THOUGHT*
LONN LANZA-KADUCE**
ABSTRACT

This paper takes issue with Chambliss and Seidman's thesis that
the process of appellate decision-making is primarily value-laden.***
Using Weber's typology of legal thought and his distinction between
value and goal-rationality, a theoretical framework is advanced to analyze judicial reasoning. The viability of this framework is demonstrated
when it is applied to a particularly strategic capital punishment case.
Personal values are not nearly so important as judicial perceptions of
formal rules about how to proceed. Legal analysis seeks to separate the
challenged legal means designed to achieve governmental objectives
from those governmental ends in a goal-rational way. For the most
part, this avoids imbuing argumentation with the value questions inherent in the objectives. Empirical data are not used as readily as Chainbliss and Seidman suggest, and when they are, means/ends distinctions
are maintained. The problem of legitimation and some of Chambliss
and Seidman's extra-legal inputs are then examined to see why judges
are constrained to follow formal, neutral, and goal-rational lines of argumentation where law remains the polestar for decision-making.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In their now classic analysis of appellate courts, Chambliss and
* Special thanks to Charles W. Thomas, Marcia Radosevich, and Ronald L. Akers for

useful suggestions and criticisms of earlier drafts of this manuscript. Their comments are
appreciated and, hopefully, accurately reflected in this manuscript. The flaws remaining are
of my own making and should not be attributed to them.
** Assistant Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of Florida; Ph.D. University of Iowa, 1981; M.A. University of Iowa, 1978; J.D. University of Iowa, 1976; B.S.
University of Iowa, 1972.
*** An earlier version of this paper was presented in the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C. November, 1981.
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Seidman argue that courts are engaged in rule-making activities, especially when presented with so-called "trouble cases."' Trouble cases reflect disputes about which legal norms should be applied and represent
instances where the purported self-contained logical system of law fails
to provide a clear rule to guide decision-making. Judges, therefore, are
forced to go outside the law for direction. Chambliss and Seidman
adopt a conflict orientation to appellate decision-making and argue that
considerations or inputs in addition to permissible rules of law-such as
the wealth or status of interested parties, socialization and attributes of
judges, organizational pressures and concerns, and informal political
and situational factors--operate to determine new rules that favor certain outcomes and groups over others. 2 They conclude that decisionmaking is necessarily value-laden despite official pronouncements of
value-neutrality.
The 1res~nt purpose is not to challenge the validity of Chambliss
and Seidman's conclusion. One need only to examine the doctrine of
standing to litigate to appreciate how rules that are completely judgemade serve to restrict potential inputs, thereby limiting potential outcomes in ways that favor some interests and values over others. 3 Yet the
Chambliss and Seidman conclusion is almost a truism: the courts deal
with normative phenomena so any dispute settlement will favor one position over others. Their more significant formulation of the problem
1 W.

CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER 85-89 (1971).

2 Id. at 89-113.
3 In an unpublished, and now somewhat dated manuscript, applying Chambliss and
Seidman's specific propositions, see CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 113, to the law of
standing, I argued that standing is a judge-made rule that "becomes an integral part of the
decision-making structure itself." Lanza-Kaduce, The Footing of Standing. The Historical
Development and the Functional Relevance of the Federal Standing Doctrine 65 (July, 1976)
(unpublished manuscript). Standing serves to limit the range of issues and inputs in appellate
decision-making. For example, standing to secure judicial review is usually denied litigants
whose interests are common to all citizens, U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), and is severely
restricted in taxpayer lawsuits regarding federal expenditures; Degee v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S.
162 (1913); Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676
(D.C. Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1922). Yet some areas are granted judicial preference;
federal taxpayer suits seeking to vindicate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
are permitted. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The federal standing doctrine may be
more restrictive than its counterparts adopted by the states precluding decisions on the merits
of some constitutional controversies. See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429
(1952). These kinds of limitations, in turn, predetermine the range of outputs as can be seen
in its extreme form in Richardson where standing was used to preclude review and rule-defining in the entire area of C.I.A. accountability. I concluded that the standing doctrine, by
allowing the court to avoid the merits of controversial constitutional issues which frequently
involved other levels or branches of government, contributed to maintaining the organizational position and general legitimacy enjoyed by the Court.
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was not to examine the outcomes-which are inevitably value-ladenbut the process by which they are decided upon.
Chambliss and Seidman maintain that the formal style of law finding-using law and its internal logical to find and apply law-is only
possible for clear-cut (i.e., nontrouble) cases. For trouble cases, 4 they
conclude that the system of justification for announcing new rules currently dominant in appellate courts consists of pragmatic legal realism
where empirical evidence about the means by which desired ends could
5
be obtained would result in some means being valued over others.
Those means thought to be better-like school integration over separate-but-equal institutions to obtain equal protection 6 -are adopted.
Thus, legitimation for decision-making in trouble cases is realized
through empiricism rather than self-contained legal logic. In the process, however, Chambliss and Seidman argue that the choice of means
becomes blurred with legal ends and infused with value considerations.
As such, they likened legal thought to what Weber might call "valuerationality:" reasoning where the specification of means is in terms of
acting in accord with some absolute value. 7 In the above example, they
would argue that both integration (the means) and equality (the legal
8
end) were given moral value.
4 "Trouble cases arise because either. . . [there is] disagreement about the formulation
of the rule of law. . . [or] the content of the applicable rule is subject to doubt." CHAMBLISS
& SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 87.
5 Id. at 135-45.
6 Id. at 137-38.
7 M.

RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY I (E. Shils & M.

Rheinstein trans. 1954).
8 As it turned out, Chambliss and Seidman selected an unusually complex example to
illustrate their claim-one that has not worked out consistently with predictions derivable
from their position. It seems incongruous that integration has meant busing which has. led
both to more (albeit de facto) school segregation through white flight and to disputes about
gains in educational achievement. See J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY, & J. MOORE, TRENDS IN
SCHOOL SEGREGATION 1968-1973 (1975); Coleman, Liberty andEqualityin SchoolDesegregation,
6 Soc. POL. 9 (1976); Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the
Research, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1978, at 17; Rossell, School Desegregation and
Community Social Change, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1978 at 133. If Chambliss and
Seidman's emphasis on pragmatic legal realism were generally correct, the court could have
already reversed itself about forced busing based on new findings. The Weberian analysis
outlined in the following pages may suggest why the Court has been reluctant to do so. At
the risk of getting the cart ahead of the horse, let me try to explicate briefly.
Integration (implemented by forced busing after Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
County Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)) became the means selected to achieve equal
protection of the law. Separate-but-equal schools were shown to be inadequate to achieve
this end. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). To this extent, Chambliss and
Seidman's emphasis on empirical information was accurate. But as will be developed, the use
of social science information is the exception rather than the rule in legal argumentation. See
also Dorin, Two Diferent Worlds: Criminologists,Jasticesand RacialDiscriminationin the Imposition
of CapitalPunishmentin Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. LIT. CRIM. 1667 (1981). Importantly, busing
was imposed by the courts only upon a finding of de jure discrimination-de facto educa-
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The purpose of this paper is to explore further the process of judicial reasoning and to argue, contrary to Chambliss and Seidman,
(1) that empiricism and the formal style of reasoning with its heavier
emphasis on Weber's "goal" or "purposive rationality" (clear specification of means so that values are only linked to ends) can coexist, 9
(2) that pragmatic legal realism is not necessarily the dominant mode of
legal thought, 10 and (3) that legal argumentation may be more goalrational and value-neutral and less value-laden than is commonly believed even if legal outcomes are not. I I To do so, a "trouble case" on
capital punishment will be analyzed to illustrate how judges present remarkably value-free and formal rationales for their decisions.
Before beginning, it is important to state explicitly a limitation inherent in using case analysis to infer about decision-making processess.
Formal court opinions may or may not reflect how the decisions were
tional inequalities have never been actionable under the fourteenth amendment. Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), confirmed this when the Court refused to order inter-district
busing that included white suburban districts because de jure discrimination had not been
established in these outlying districts. Busing, then, is a means to remedy a vary narrowly
defined equal protection problem-de jure school segregation. The nearly complete closure
in legal thinking does not permit busing to be linked to de facto or institutionalized discrimination or to the general quality of education where de jure segregation had not occured. A
precise Weberian specification of means and legally established goals would anticipate this
constraint and would not recognize the centrality of white flight see United States v. Scotland
Neck City Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), or unimproved academic performance in
combating any de jure segregation of schools found to exist. The blurring of meins with ends
to which Chambliss and Seidman referred has occured more often off the bencbh as on it. Cf.
Yudof, School Desegregation.- Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,and Social Science Research in the
Supreme Court, 42 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. Autumn 1978, at 86. Academicians, politicians,
and social scientists have infused the policy debate with these substantive but largely extralegal concerns-perhaps because they do not appreciate the unique character of legal
thought.
9 M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 1.
10 See also Dorin, supra note 8, who reviews what appears to be deliberate judicial avoidance of social science information about discrimination in executions for rape.
11 My intent is not to engage in the multifaceted debate about what Weber or others
precisely mean by value neutrality. Following Chambliss and Seidman's lead, CHAMBsIss &
SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 2-4, I adopt a very loose approach when I use relatively "valueneutral" or "value-free" (as opposed to "value-loaded" or "value-laden"). Readers should
not equate my comments with any highly specialized formulation of this elusive term of art. I
basically adopt the counterpoint to Chambliss and Seidman's claim of value-loaded court
structures. I mean that legal concerns are paramount to appellate decision-making and that
the argumentation of appellate judges is mostly impartial, neutral, and unbiased by personal
considerations. Chambliss and Seidman, of course, stress the opposite view: appellate decision-making is laden with normative considerations over and above the legalities involved.
We are all concerned with analyzing the process and form of legal decision-making and our
differing approaches reflect only relative differences in emphasis. I argue that court opinions
are relatively more goal (as opposed to value) rational and therefore more free from personal
value orientations. I argue that empirical information is relied on to a lesser extent and that
the most important sources of legitimacy derive from tradition (precedent) and goal rationality (formal rationality) rather than science, although science is occasionally used.
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actually made or how the inquiry proceeded. As windows opening on to
the decision-making process, they may distort as much as reveal. Indeed, the opinions offered in the cases may be nothing more than afterthe-fact rationalizations. Yet it is safe to assume that value neutral and
goal rational opinion-writing is a necessary concommitant of more open
and neutral inquiry and decision-making. It is unlikely that a justice
who decides cases in a highly disinterested, detached, and analytical
way would revert to argumentation grounded in personal values in
his/her opinion-writing. Therefore, case analysis provides opportunity
for a "weak" test of Weber's position. If opinions do not reveal goal
rationality, Weber's notions would be challenged in part. However,
finding goal rationality does not prove his ultimate accuracy. In other
words, goal rationality in legal opinions would be a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for value-neutrality in decision-making-.
But even if court opinions do not always reflect the actual inquiry
and decision-making process but merely package dispute settlement in a
more palatable form, case analysis is worthwhile. Court opinions are
symbolic statements of law and authority. They provide the ratio
decidendi and precedent that constrain and influence subsequent legal
thinking and decisions about the contested subject matter both in and
out of court. In Weberian terms, conduct is "meaningfully oriented"
and conforming when actors are cognizant of the rational means to
achieve the desired end.' 2 Thus, the issue of why judicial argumentation takes the form it does remains of academic interest even if court
opinions do not always accurately mirror the decision-making process
that produced them. Opinions provide the building blocks and struc3
ture from which and within which later decisions are made.1
12 Beirne, Ideology andRationality in Max Weer' Sociology of Law, in MARXISM AND LAW 63
(P. Beine & R. Quinney eds. 1982). Other modem students of methods of inquiry have
noted how past work in learned disciplines shapes future accomplishments. For example, A.
KAPLAN, A CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 3-11 (1964) distinguishes a discipline's reconstructive logic
(the accounts of how the inquiry proceeded) from the logic-in-use (the actual inquiry employed in the disciplinary advance). Significantly, he notes that "a reconstruction may become, or at any rate influence, the logic-in-use." Id. at 9.
13 My inclination is to emphasize this approach to the significance of the ensuing analysis.
My earlier review of the standing doctrine, see supra note 3, revealed that while precedent and
legal argumentation constrained the legal development of standing, its modern scope and
utilization were explained better by the latent functions it fulfilled than by the official rationales provided by the Court. Importantly, the resulting doctrine could be related to the
Court's organizational interests and its need for legitimacy, another reason to examine the
court opinions. The standing study, however, did not look at the form of argumentation but
focused only on the outcomes of court opinions.
I also take issue with the detractors of case analysis methodology. I view the alternatives
available for examining appellate decision-making as being severely restricted. If we do not
use the opinions themselves, we are left with investigative journalism to uncover the "true"
reasons for decision-making. While journalistic accounts can bring important information to
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Moreover, the form of the argumentation may also be related to
other concerns and processes. That is why the last section of this paper
will examine such factors or inputs as judicial and legal socialization
4nd organizational interests of the Court, especially its quest for legitimacy, in an attempt to understand why modern legal thought takes the
form it does.
It is for this reason that my approach does not refute conflict interpretations of law-making and application; it only requires more sophisticated analysis. No other than Frederick Engels recognized that when
professional lawyers become necessary, [law] is opened up which for all its
general dependence on production and trade, still has its own capacity for
reacting upon those spheres as well. In a modern state, law must not only
correspond to the general economic position and be its expression, but also
be an expression which is consistent in itself, and which does not. . . look
glaringly inconsistent. And in order to achieve this, the faithful reflection
of economic conditions is more and more infringed upon.14
Weber, also, would primarily adopt a conflict orientation although
of a more pluralistic nature.' 5 Part of the significance of my effort to
recast the orientation toward appellate decision-making lies in the shift
of focus from looking for malevolent or ignorant judges (who either blatantly seek to oppress the powerless or are too stupid to understand the
consequences of their decisions) to examining why reasonably competent and decent people write opinions as they do. Let us turn then, to
Weber's theoretical framework.
Weber's distinction between value-rationality and goal-rationality
has already been made. There are several other important themes in
Weber's work that converge on the problem at hand. First, Weber
maintained that ideas and thought at least as much as material conditions provided the important impetus for meaningful behavior or social
action.' 6 Second, he saw modern societies moving toward increased rationality-more reliance on means/ends thinking resulting in systematic, general abstract rules designed to guide social action. 17 Third,
light, the scientific weaknesses associated with such a research methodology are at least as
great as with case analysis. Ultimately, those who would pierce the official opinions to locate
the "real" causes of judicial decisions can never be refuted. Since we cannot get into the
judges' minds, we can infer about appellate decision-making only from what we know
through their actions and deeds. Their opinions remain an important, even if imperfect,
source of data.
14 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, Letter to ConradSchmidt, October 27, 1890, in LITERATURE AND
ART 3 (1947). See generaly M. CAIN & A. HuNT, MARx AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979).
15 See Beirne, supra note 12, for a Marxian critique of Weber's epistemology and sociology
of law.
16 Se genera/y M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM,
(1948); Beirne, supra note 12.
17 See A. GIDDENS, CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 178-84 (1971); J. EL-
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Weber was concerned with how rationality as well as charisma and tradition served to legitimate authority. 8 Fourth, he envisioned modern
social action as being carried out increasingly in organizations based on
rational-legal principles.' 9 Fifth, among other things, the rational-legal
organization emphasized training and expertise, procedural rules, and
impersonal, disinterested fulfillment of the duties of the office. 20 Finally,
Weber noted that the legalism of the West was unique, and he offered a
typology of legal thought by which to analyze the course of the social
2
actions courts take. '
II.

WEBER'S TYPOLOGY

Weber's typology of legal thought is based on two major analytic
dimensions: rationality versus irrationality and substantiveness versus
formality. Rational types of thought are characterized by reliance on
abstract rules for finding and applying laws that are reasonably related
to case situations. Irrationality indicates a lack of such rules or a lack of
reasonable relationship between rules and situations. Substantive legal
thought emphasizes legal contents and outcome whereas formal approaches stress process. 2 2 Figure 1 depicts the basic types of legal
thought advanced by Weber and gives an example of the kind of legal
system in which the respective types of thought predominate.
An example of substantive irrationality is the Khadi dispute.settlement of the desert marketplace where the nomadic lifestyles prevented
general legal rules and procedures from being institutionalized. Consequently, litigants from different nomadic bands would bring their dispute to whichever third party leader was presently available. The
arbiter of the moment would decide an outcome, guided mostly by reaction to the immediate case, and then return with his people to the desert. If the exact same issue were to come into dispute shortly thereafter,
litigants would have to take it to a second judge-for-a-day who was free
to decide the case on any grounds he thought meritorious having neither
awareness of precedent nor explicit substantive rules to apply. Hence
DRIDGE, MAX WEBER: THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL REALITY
STEIN, supra note 7, at 301-21.

53-70 (1971); M. RHEIN-

18 See M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at xxxi-xxxii, 8-9, 322-37; A. GIDDENS, supra note 17,
at 156-57; M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 226 (1968).
19 A. GIDDENS, supra note 17, at 178-84.
20 See 3 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-63 (1968); A. GIDDENS, supra note 17, at

158.
M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at xxxix-lv, 61-64; Beirne, supra note 12, at 56-57.
See also Davis, Law as a Type of Social Control, in LAW AND CONTROL IN SOCIETY, 17, 2728 (R. Akers & R. Hawkins, eds. 1975).
21

22
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FIGURE 1
WEBER'S TYPOLOGY OF LEGAL THOUGHT
Irrational

(penErnl nih~traet riie ahsent~

Substantive
(outcome and rule
content emphasis)

Formal
(emphasis on process
to analyze the cases)

Rational
(general abstract rules nresent

Marxist States
Khadi Justice
Theocracies

Logical Variant (law as a
closed system)
Western Liberal Democracies
Ordeals and
Oracles
Extrinsic Variant (law
depends on observable events
given legal significance)
No clear example

the emphasis was on the justice of case outcomes with no extant rule of
law to guide it-substantive irrationality according to Weber.
Case determination via ordeal or oracle represents the formal irrational mode of legal thought. In this instance, stress is placed on adopting the prescribed means, but these means are not realistically related to
any abstract end the law is designed to serve. To be sure, the means do
produce outcomes but ordeals are not logically or empirically related to
general abstract notions of law or justice. Hence, ordeals exemplify irrationality in Weber's scheme.
Substantive rationality in legal thought predominates in those systems where the law is subordinated to a greater ideology or value system
so that the contents of legal rules and the outcomes of cases are derived
from the dictates of these larger abstract rules or principles. For example, what matters in Marxist states is that legal rules and case outcomes
comport with Marxist ideology-procedures are far less important than
ideologically correct results. Similarly, in theocracies, judicial decisions
stress rules and outcomes that reflect religious dogma. In this type of
legal thought, judges find and interpret law by referring to extra-legal
ideology so law, while guided by general rules (i.e., rational), would be
intentionally value-laden; law nested in a larger value system. Even the
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choice of means or procedures would be linked to some absolute value
and so it would also be infused with normative meaning.
It is the final form of legalism that Weber saw characterizing the
West. Western legal thought was viewed as being rational (guided by
general rules) and formal (emphasizing process). By adopting a carefully selected general, abstract process of factual analysis to draw out
pertinent unambiguous properties of the facts to guide law application,
rule contents and case outcomes would be largely nonproblematic for
the courts. Weber conceived of two variants of this formal rationality in
legal thought. First, there is the logical form where the the rules and
procedures of law finding and application are contained within the abstract system of law itself. Here law is viewed as a closed system of logic.
Second, there is the extrinsic variant where legal thinking still proceeds
by emphasizing general procedures designed to attain the ends of law,
but there is a reliance on sense data or external observable information
to inform the application of law. Law is not seen as a closed system of
logic.
Weber saw the logical variant of formal rationality as typifying law
in advanced Western nations. Upon closer examination, we can identify
three different ways in which modern Western systems find and interpret law in these ideally closed systems of logic. One takes an inductive
approach and arrives at the general principle of law to be applied to the
case at hand by examining how law was applied in past cases presenting
similar issues. The stare deciris method emphasizes case precedent and is
exemplified by the English Common Law tradition. The second
method of law finding is deductive in nature and derives from the Civil
Law tradition of the European Continent. Elaborate codes contain
nearly exhaustive statutory provisions from which the law is deduced to
apply to a particular case. The third approach to logically formal and
rational law finding is the constitutional method utilized in the American jurisdiction. Here a few very general rules are contained in a constitution but their application, indeed much of their substance, is
determined to a large extent by case precedent. Accordingly, it is a hybrid solution. Regardless of the method, the Western ideal is to look to
the law to find and apply the law. Hence, the role of extra-legal value
considerations can be minimized.
It is difficult to find a society where legal thought based on extrinsically formal rationality has dominated. The emphasis of this variant is
on a rational process to guide legal decision-making, but dispositive features of the process are external to the law. What is emphasized in this
extrinsic variant is reliance on "sense data" where readily observable
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events are given legal significance. 23 Weber provides examples of extrinsically formal rationality by using things like the legal significance attached to official seals or the execution of a signature. Chambliss and
Seidman's recognition of empiricism in judicial argumentation raises the
possibility of extending Weber's analysis to all empirical data. 24 Since
science can be viewed (as it was by Weber) -as being a value-neutral
process to collect and analyze sense information to find general, unambiguous characteristics of relevant facts,2 5 it provides a formal process
extrinsic to law for dealing with trouble cases. Weber anticipated that
science would provide knowledge for policy-makers to act upon. 26 This
extension of Weber's extrinsic formal rationality is distinguished from
Chambliss and Seidman's pragmatic legal realism by the role of goalrationality. Where science is viewed as value neutral, reliance on formal
process would not require the introduction of value considerations into
decision-making because means could be separated from value-laden legal goals and the efficacy of means in attaining ends could be evaluated
scientifically.2 7 This offers the prospect of using science to provide information about how to achieve legal ends. What we would have if this
were adopted, would not be a legal realism 28 where legal decisions are
understood in terms of social science but a "scientific jurisprudence"
where an empirical methodology would provide information to guide
29
legal policy-making.
Ostensibly, extrinsic formal rationality could be invoked in two
ways. Either empirical science may be relied on to locate a means by
which to attain the legal goal (goal-rationality) only when law's own
logical system for finding the applicable rule is incomplete, or empirical
data could be employed to review the effectiveness of means already
provided for in the law relative to alternatives. For present purposes,
23
24
25
26
27

M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 63.
W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 89-113.
M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1-47 (1949).
Id. at 18-19.
M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at n.2, explicitly recognized the parallel in Weber be-

tween goal-rationality and formal rational legal thought.
28 See, e.g., Holmes, The Pathof Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Llewellyn, Some Realism
about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
29 Beutel, The Essence of ExperimentalJurisprdence,in R. SIMON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
INTERDISCIPLINARY READINGS, 163-77 (1968); Cf. Nonet, ForJurisprudential
Sociology, 10 LAw
& SOCIETY REVIEW 525 (1976); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17-19 (2d ed.
1977).
Recently there have been a number of debates on the role ofsocial science in law, including special journal issues dedicated to the problem. See, School Desegregation: Lessonsforthe First
Twenty-fwe Years, (pt. 1), 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1978 at 1; SchoolDesegregation:
Lessons ofthe First Twenty-fte Years, (pt. 2), 42 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB., Autumn 1978 at 1;
Symposium on Empirical Research h7 Administrative Law, (pt. 1), 31 AD. LAW REV. 443 (1979);
Symposium on EmpiricalResearch in Administrative Law, (pt. 2), 32 AD. LAW REV. 1 (1980).
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what is important is that extrinsic formal rationality or scientific jurisprudence provides a relatively value-free means of finding and applying
law even in those "trouble cases" where Chambliss and Seidman would
argue that value considerations are most likely to be interjected. Consequently, Weber provides a scheme by which we can analyze court opinions to see whether they offer relatively value-free (either extrinsic or
logical formal legal thought where goal-rationality reigns) or valueladen (substantively rational legal thought with its openness to valuerationality) means for finding and applying the law.
III.

LEGAL THOUGHT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

To illustrate the utility of Weber's typology as an aid in understanding legal thought, a capital punishment case was purposively selected for several reasons. First, capital punishment has been and
remains a strongly felt, highly controversial subject where the legal battle might very well be waged on the plane of value disagreement.
Therefore, it should be particularly difficult for value-free (logically or
extrinsically formal) forms of reasoning to dominate in deciding this issue. The clash between values is further exacerbated by whether values
are accepted as posited or whether they, too, are objects of rational scrutiny.3 0 Second, deciding the constitutionality of capital punishment directly presents the court with the dilemma of whether to stress process
(formality) or legal outcome and content (substantiveness). Consequently, issues primarily of formality/substantiveness but also of rationality/irrationality interface in the problem of capital punishment.
The pivotal cases in the official development of legal thought
about capital punishment were Furman v. Georgia and its companion
cases, Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. 3 1 For the first time, the
Supreme Court was willing to review whether the substance of capital
punishment statutes was unconstitutional because the outcomes were
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment
either in a category of cases like the ones at bar or per se-across the
board. The previous eighth amendment attacks before the high court
only challenged the methods employed to execute capital felons.3 2 Be30 See the discussion of positive versus normative approaches to the death penalty in Radin, TheJuridenceof Deah: Evolving Standardforthe Crueland UnusualPunihmentClause, 126
U. PENN. L. REV. 989, 1034-42.
31 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furman case resulted from a litigation campaign supported
by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, see M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
32 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) upheld death by firing squads and Zn re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) found electrocution a permissible method. However, certain methods of punishment (like corporal punishment) have been found to be barbaric and hence
unconstitutional in lower courts. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Morales v.
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cause the language of the Constitution explicitly stated that no one will

be deprived of life without due process of law, it is safe to conclude that
the framers of the Constitution accepted capital punishment. However,

non-capital cases involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause
had at an early time indicated that "evolving standards of decency" was
the rule for interpreting the eighth amendment. 33 In Weems v. United

States, the Supreme Court found that a twelve- to twenty-year prison
term previously authorized for falsifying a minor document had become
so disproportionate when balanced against evolving standards of decency that it was violative of the eighth amendment. It was also clearly
established before Furman that eighth amendment protections applied to
the states via the fourteenth amendment 34 so the states were not free to

exact more severe punishment than the federal constitution would
allow.

With this background the nature of the legal thought presented in
nine separate opinions issued in Furman can be examined. Furman provides one of the rare occasions to analyze concurrently the independent
reasoning of all nine justices, although each dissenting opinion (except
for Justice Blackmun's) was supported by all of the dissenters. Basically,
what was successfully challenged in Furman was that states permitting
complete discretion in sentencing convicted felons to death violated the
Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973). Barbarism remains the test for determining the
constitutionality of the method of punishment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
33 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
In Fwman all of the justices concurred or endorsed opinions that saw the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as being flexible or variable-evolving in
meaning over time. However, Justice Rehnquist in Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280,
308 (1976) (Rehnquist J., dissenting), subsequently adopted the fixed position formerly announced by Black in McGautha v. California 402 U.S. 183, 225 (1971) (Black, J., separate
opinion), and also advanced by others that would have the eighth amendment substantively
interpreted only in light of its historical dimensions. The logical consequence of this fixed
view is that the eighth amendment would never present any future "trouble cases" and formal legal closure would be achieved in this regard. This, in some ways, represents formal
rationality in its extreme form but also illustrates one of its shortcomings. Weber was alert to
the prospect that instituting increasingly logical and rational procedures would ultimately
result in a closed system of reasoning to guide social action thereby erecting an "iron cage"
that could prevent adaptation and adjustment to changing circumstances or idiographic situations. Even though there is movement toward this type of rational system of justice, see
Davis, supra note 22, other systems also exist. In fact, the inductive method of the AngloAmerican system was seen as having both logically and empirically rational components.
Arguably, the empirical components of relying on the observable facts of each case helps to
retard logical closure and avoid the spectre of the iron cage of rationality. Although left
undeveloped, an advantage for stare decsis systems implicit in a Weberian analysis is that
courts can rely on two different vehicles to legitimate their decisions. Authoritativeness can
rest either on tradition or rationality. It remains unlikely in systems that emphasize formality
and position over personality that legitimation through charisma would be very important.
34 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 35 In
Furman, the relevant legal ends were the permissible goals of punishment
(such as retribution and deterrence). The means for achieving these legitimate government ends were alternatively defined as either capital
35 It is especially important, and difficult, to distinguish McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971), where unbridled jury discretion in capital sentencing was challenged on the
procedural due process grounds of the fourteenth amendment. There, the defendants claimed
that the absolute discretion allowed by the statutes was "fundamentally lawless" and so did
not provide due proces of law. Id. at 196. The court reviewed the instructions given the juries
and previous efforts to implement standards and concluded that standards would be of such
minimal utility in enhancing procedural fairness that they were not mandated by the requirements of the due process clause. In view of Furman, the McGautha holding is very narrow
indeed, at least for Justices White and Stewart who joined both majority opinions allowing
Furman to accomplish what they were reluctant for McGautha to do. In fairness to them, and
in rebuttal of Chief Justice Burger's view that Mcautha decided Furman, the issue raised by
Furman probably has a somewhat more substantive rather than purely procedural basis. Although the distinction is in no way a clean one (as any student studying substantive versus
procedural due process appreciates), the following trichotomy is proposed to help clarify the
matter. Some matters are purely-procedural and the issue is whether the prdcedures for applying the content of the law are fair. Mcautha concluded that, by itself, the procedure
allowing unguided discretion to apply the death penalty could not be found unfair. Other
issues raise questions about the content of law itself. For example, is capital punishment itself
impermissible no matter what the procedures used to invoke it? As we shall see, this is the
issue tackled by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Furman. A third, and intermediary way of
framing the legal issue is to focus on the outcome(s) of applying legal contents via certain
procedures. This, too, is customarily viewed as substantive in current legal usage although
the accuracy of the label could be questioned. Significantly, an outcome focus recognizes that
even if the procedures by themselves have been found acceptable and the content in isolation
could be permissible, the result or pattern of outcomes may be objectionably arbitrary or
discriminatory. As we shall see, this middle ground is the way Justices White, Stewart, and
Douglas saw the Furman case. There is, then, a major difference between how the issues arising from an eighth amendment challenge can be framed as opposed to the fourteenth amendment procedural due process attack even if the decision in Furman ultimately resulted in the
same kind of guided discretion sought but rejected in Mcautha. Notice the need to clearly
separate means from ends in understanding the cases. The significance of the source of the
challenge can also be seen in comparing the nature of appropriate remedies. Had MeCaulha
been successful, the court itself would have had to fashion procedural guidelines to impose on
all jury mandated punishments out of nothing but the general words of due process. Arguably, judges who had not used the same guidelines would also be overturned because the particular guidelines would have had a constitutional basis. The successful challenge in Furman,
on the other hand, allowed the court merely to prohibit capital punishment where discretion
was unguided. The states were then free to legislate their own secondary rules on these matters. Guided discretion provisions have been subsequently reviewed and upheld beginning
with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). That the source of the constitutional challenge
should have so much import in decision-making and opinion-writing itself attests to the formal rationality underlying our legal system. If judges wanted to decide issues on the basis of
values, they would not be so inclined to make such fine distinctions. As one of the anonymous
reviewers of this manuscript noted, drawing such fine distinctions may help justices avoid
head-on collisions of the sort that would preclude further collective efforts to maintain formal
rationality. Thus the nature of legal argumentation may well serve the function of masking
value conflicts (for the justices as well as the public) in order to enhance the authoritativeness
of judicial declarations and dispute resolution.
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punishment itself or unguided and complete discretion in capital
sentencing.
A.

THE DISSENTING OPINIONS

The clearest example of goal rationality in legal analysis was contained in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, which explicitly indicated his personal "abhorrence" of the death penalty 36 as a means of
punishment even while refusing to find it unconstitutional because it
was sufficiently related to permissible goals of punishment to pass constitutional muster. Blackmun's argumentation relied on procedural rules
of interpretation he thought were mandated by prior cases to urge judicial restraint 3 7 and deterence to legislative pronouncements 38 on the
matter. He scolded the majority for invoking their values about the
propriety of capital punishment and criticized them for transforming
capital punishment into an end in and of itself that was either good or
bad. He concluded: "I fear the Court has over-stepped. It has sought
and has achieved an end."'39 It would have been easy for Blackmun to
follow personal inclinations and to adopt a line of reasoning to reject the
death penalty, but it would have been professionally "deviant." He resisted because he tacitly severed the means of punishment from the values the goals were supposed to serve and 'refused to allow what he
thought were nonlegal considerations to enter his analysis. This goal
rationality and the logic of judicial procedures in analysis would not
permit him to indulge his personal beliefs and values. His legal reasoning was bluntly value-free and of the logically formal rational type. He
relied on abstract rules logically located in legal doctrine that emphasized the process of decision-making and not the outcome. The only
other dissenter who went on record as personally opposing almost all
40
capital punishment was Chief Justice Burger.
Burger and the remaining dissenters (Powell and Rehnquist) also
decried what they considered to be the substantive thrust of the majority
opinions. They saw procedural doctrine as having been shattered and
refused to ban capital punishment judicially by relying on such procedural and structural rationales as "stare dec-ss, federalism, judicial
restraint and, most importantly, separation of powers."'4' These argu36 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405.
37 Id. at 407-09.
38 Id. at 410-13.
39 Id. at 414.
40 Id. at 375.
41 Id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also voiced reservations about
Furman's seeming contradiction of precedent, id. at 399-40 1, about judicial restraint, id. at
405, and about separation of powers, id. at 403-05. Justice Rehnquist had concerns and
doubts about the wisdom of Furman in light of federalism, id. at 468-69, judicial restraint, id.
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ments were offered without keying on the ultimate morality of the substance or outcomes of death penalty statutes. Basically, the dissenters
applied principles that maintained the closure of the legal system to decide the matter. Their reasoning exemplified logically formal rationality, and the dissenters flaunted its formal emphasis in an effort to detract
from majority opinions they considered to be too outcome-oriented and
therefore less authoritative. Many of the more specific arguments in the
dissents were to rebut particular points made in the majority opinions
and are assessed elsewhere in this paper. The crux of their position,
however, was that Furman really did not present much of a "trouble
case" that required going beyond law previously established by legal
logic to find the rule to apply to this case.
B.

THE MAJORITY OPINIONS

The majority opinions that overturned the death penalty in Furman
and its companion cases are most central in analyzing legal-thought because these are the arguments advanced to break with tradition. These
justices recognized Furman as a "trouble case" that required announcing
new law. Because the issue was framed in terms of the substance or
outcomes of death penalty statutes rather than the procedures or means
by which the particular sentence was determined or executed, it might
be expected that the justices would have to engage in substantive rational analysis where the law would be informed by a higher order ideology external to the legal system. In fact, only one justice was openly
willing to engage in such a value-laden exercise and even he couched his
analysis in logically located precedent.
Justice Brennan unbashedly stated that the eighth amendment
should be read to serve the higher philosophical values of "human dignity." 42 His test: "A punishment is 'cruel and unusual' . . . if it does
not comport with human dignity." 43 His conclusion: "death is today a
at 470, and the separation of powers, id. at 466-70. A sampling of their language may be
instructive.
The "hydraulic pressure" that Holmes spoke of as being generated by cases of great
import! have propelled the Court to go beyond the limits of judicial power. . . Id. at 405
(Burger, J., dissenting).
It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a basic lack of
faith and confidence in the democratic process. . . .[I]mpatience with. . . legislatures
is no justification for judicial intrusion upon their historic powers. Id. at 464-65 (Powell,
J., 'dissenting).
I conclude that this decision. . . is not an act ofjudgment, but rather an act of will. Id.
at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42 Remarkably, Weber predicted that legal formalism would invite "demands for a 'social
law' to be based upon such. . .[substantive] postulates as.
WEBER, EcONOMY AND SociETY 886 (1968).
43 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 269-70.

..

'human dignity'.

.. "

2 M.
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'cruel and unusual' punishment."'44 The thrust of this line of argument
reflects what Weber types as substantive rationality in legal thought although the language itself was borrowed from Trop v. Dulles.45 Moreover, Brennan relied on several previously established criteria to arrive
at his conclusion. He tacitly borrowed from substantive due process/fundamental interest analysis where the concerns are with the arbitrariness of rules and outcomes regarding highly protected rights or
interests like life and liberty. 46 Brennan found capital punishment per
se to be "offensive to human dignity" 4 7 because of (1) the fundamental
interest in life that makes execution extremely severe, 48 (2) the strong
probability of arbitrary application, 49 (3) the rejection of capital punishment by contemporary society, 50 and (4) the existence of less severe
44

Id. at 286.

45 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).

The reasonableness of the substance of legislation first became grounds for judicial review of economic legislation, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); but then was
abandoned in this area, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Even while "substantive due process" reasoning was
being abandoned in economic matters, it was resurrected in cases involving interests more
fundamental to liberty (such as speech, religion, and marital and procreative privacy). As
Justice Brandeis observed in his concurrence in the free speech case of Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (1927):
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive
law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the
term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States ...
For other free speech cases involving fundamental interest/substantive due proces analysis,
see, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
This kind of analysis has also been applied to freedom of association, see, e.g., Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), and establishment and freedom of religion see, e.g., Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitalle, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). A more recent application of fundamental
interest/substantive due process analysis has been in the area of marital and reproductive
privacy. Cf.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice White offered a clear summary of the
analysis in his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) which overturned a ban on the distribution of birth control devices:
The nature of the right invaded is pertinent, to be sure, for statutes regulating sensitive
areas of liberty do, under the cases of this court, require "strict scrutiny,". . . and "must
be viewed in light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.". . . But
statutes, if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state
interest, and not arbitrary or capricious in application, are not invalid under the Due
Process Clause. ...
Compare this language with that used as one of the resulting tests for cruel and unusual
punishment as most succinctly stated in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592: ". . . punishment
is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it . . .makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
...Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv.
goals of punishment.
1071 (1964) was one of the first to see the substantive due process themes in the eighth
amendment.
47 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 305.
48 Id. at 286-90.
49 Id. at 291-95.
50 Id. at 295-300.
46
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alternatives to achieve legitimate penal ends.5 ' Such constitutional considerations certainly were not new to the court even if their linkage to
overriding values about human dignity was. This merging of the means
of punishment with the larger goal of human dignity represents the
value rationality of Weber where values become an integral part of the
reasoning itself. This is the kind of reasoning Chambliss and Seidman
thought characterized trouble cases, although there is less reliance by
Brennan on empirical information than Chambliss and Seidman would
expect in pragmatic legal realism.
Two other justices, White and Stewart, also tacitly took their lead
from the arbitrariness standard of substantive due process/fundamental
interest precedents. A test for such cases bears striking correspondence
to Weber's views on goal rationality as can be seen from its most succinct statement in a subsequent capital punishment case: "punishment
is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. ..,52 There is clear separation
of the means of punishment from the ends contemplated, and the value
question is attached only to the legal ends: is the objective permissible
or legitimate?
Both Justices White and Stewart were concerned with the capri53
cious nature of death penalty outcomes under the challenged statutes
rather than the ultimate morality of this means of punishment so they
moved only part way in the direction of deciding on the substance of
capital punishment. They were unwilling to declare it unconstitutional
per se but were able to void its application in the kind of cases being
challenged. Justice White declared that the unguided discretion statutes provided "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty]. . . is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not.''54 Justice Stewart could not "tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be
so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. ' 55 Their focus, then, remained
on unguided discretion in the procedures that produce unevenness in
51 Id. at 300-05.
52 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 312 (White,
J., concurring):
. . .the penalty... was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve. At
the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging
question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the Eighth
Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social

or public purposes.
53 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stuart, J., concurring), 312 (White, J.,
concurring).
54 Id. at 313.
55 Id. at 310.
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death sentence outcomes-an administrative focus that retained much
of the procedural emphasis expected in Weber's conceptualization of
formality. This procedural emphasis combined with reliance on substantive due process/fundamental interest analysis to find the applicable
law warrants typing their opinions as predominately logically formal rationality. Their processes of reasoning painstakingly avoided value considerations except those contained in the previously established legal
goals of punishment. The ultimate value of capital punishment was not
the grounds for objection. Its discretionary application, which bore too
little relationship to accepted notions of due process fairness, was. The
analysis did not allow normative orientations about the means of punishment (discretionary executions) to blur with acknowledged views
about the goals of punishment even while deciding that some substantive statutes authorizing the death penalty were unconstitutional. This
separation of means from ends is the sort of goal rationality expected in
formal reasoning and is something that minimizes the apparent role of
extra-legal values in decision-making.
Perhaps the craftiest argument against capital punishment was
presented by Justice Douglas. As one of the strongest proponents of limiting the court's role in making substantive due process determinations,5 6 he would have been hard pressed to take up the White and
Stewart analyses. Nor was Douglas comfortable with Brennan's drift
into value-rationality and substantive analysis of capital punishment.
Noting that the defendants were black5 7 and that juries (or judges, as
the case may be) have complete discretion to determine the death penalty, 58 Douglas raised the objection of unequal application of the law
permitted by discretionary statutes. 59 He insisted that if, rather than
capricious application of the death sentence, a systematic discrimination
in its use existed, then statutorily authorized discretionary death
sentences would be "cruel and unusual." 6 Douglas argued that equal
protection was necessarily implied in the cruel and unusual punishment
clause; it was part of the values incorporated in the legal goals. 6 1 To

establish discrimination Douglas relied on statistical data, 62 the sort of
empirical sense information contemplated by Weber's extrinsic formality and Chambliss and Seidman's pragmatic legal realism. His view of
the data-while not scientifically sophisticated-led him to conclude
56 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
57 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 252-53.
58 Id. at 248.
59 Id. at 249.
60 Id. at 245.
61 Id. at 242, 245.
62 Id. at 249-52. See generally, Dorin, supra note 8.
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that there was, in fact, discrimination-a conclusion consistent with
findings of more rigorous research. 63 Blacks were disproportionately
more likely to receive the death penalty. This analysis allowed Douglas
to avoid criticisms of over-reaching and of indulging in value-laden arguments. He used law's own logical system to analyze the underlying
procedural dimension of discretionary applications of capital punishment to formulate the issue so it could be objectively informed by extrinsic data rather than values. His was a mix of logical and extrinsic
formal rationality-a process of legal reasoning that is presented basically free of value considerations except for that clearly contained in the
legal end-equality in punishment.6
Although deciding the case on other grounds, Justice Powell's dissent specifically rejected the discrimination analysis.6 5 Noting that
blacks are disproportionately represented in official statistics for violent
crimes, Powell thought that adopting the discrimination interpretation
would lead to a demise of punishment.6 6 In so doing, he confused the
significance of the argument and misunderstood the relevance of empirical procedure and data. An extrinsically formal line of reasoning would
still emphasize process, except the process used to locate relevant information for decision-making is not the logical system of law but the rational pursuit of sense data. That would mean applying accepted
standards of scientific methodology. A scientific analysis of racial discrimination in capital dispositions would require adequate controls for
legally relevant variables like the heinousness of the offense. Accord63 For recent reviews, see Bowers & Pierce, ArbitrarinessandDiscriminationunder Post-Funman
CapitalStatutes, 26 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 562 (1980); Kleck, RacialDisaiminationin Cdrminal Sentendng, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981). Kleck concluded that discrimination occurred
only in Southern states. He noted that studies done outside of the South finding discrimination failed to include sufficient statistical controls. Ironically, in his additional data about

discrimination and the death penalty, he also neglected to utilize controls. Moreover, his
measurement of execution risk excluded inter-racial homicides-a potentially critical omission for capital cases, see Garfinkle, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-radalHomicides, 27 Soc.
FoRcEs 396 (1949); cf. Radelet, Racial Characteritic:sand the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv.
918 (1981); Wolfgang & Riedel, RaceJudicialDiscretlion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119

(1973).
64 Statutes making the death penalty mandatory for some kinds of felony convictions have
subsequently been declared unconstitutional. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Interestingly, had Douglas' Furman analysis
been adopted, the ultimate result may have been the complete abolishment of the death
penalty because of continued discrimination even under guided discretion statutes. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 63; Radelet, supra note 63. This would have resulted not from substantive considerations about its morality but purely due to application shortcomings--a
relatively value free approach to deciding a very basic substantive and value-laden issue.
Capital punishment may be acceptable only if we have fair ways by which execution can
achieve equitable outcomes and its intended goals.
65 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 443-50.
66 Id. at 447.
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ingly, voiding the death penalty due to demonstrated discrimination in
its application would not necessitate nullifying sanctions for other violent crimes. However, if it could be shown empirically that imprisonment is also disproportionately meted out to blacks after all relevant
legal variables are controlled for, then the Douglas argument would
have relevance to this punishment too. To date, however, most of the
empirical research using such controls indicates minimal racial discrimi67
nation in sentencing where capital punishment is not involved.
From a Weberian perspective the most detailed and intriguing
opinion was that of Justice Marshall which ruled capital punishment to
be unconstitutional per se. However, Justice Marshall refused to join
Justice Brennan in reasoning substantively and agreed that judges
should not act on the grounds of finding the penalty "personally offensive."'68 Consequently, his search for law attempted to rely on formal
69
rationality employing both the logic of law and extrinsic evidence.
67 For reviews, see Hagan, Extra-legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a
Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 357 (1974); Kleck, supra note 63.
68 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 369 n.163.
69 Others are less convinced that Marshall is a formalist. Indeed, the present examination
of his reasoning is limited to one case and it adopts a highly specialized approach to formalism which centers on goal rationality-a clear specification and separation of means from
ends so that the means are chosen, not on the basis of value preference, but because they are
either logically or empirically related to the legal ends. It is this Weberian perspective on
formalism that I will seek to illustrate from Marshall's Furman opinion.
In anticipation of criticism of my highlighting the formalist features in Marshall's argumentation, let me note that capital punishment is not the only area where Marshall's reasoning comports with a Weberian perspective on goal-rational formalism. One needs only to
look at his development of the "sliding scales" test in equal protection law to see another
major example of reasoning where a means/ends analysis was pursued by Justice Marshall.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 88 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The "sliding scales" approach and its application can be clearly seen in Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 124-25:
We must consider the substantiality of the state interests sought to be served, and we
must scrutinize the reasonableness of the means by which the State has sought to advance its interests. Differences in the application of this test are, in my view, a function
of the constitutional importance of the interests at stake. . . . Beyond the question of
the adequacy of the state's purpose for classification, the Court traditionally has become
increasingly sensitive to the means by which a State chooses to act as its action affects
more directly interests of constitutional significance.
Given the importance of education to free speech and political participation, Marshall was
persuaded to strike down how Texas financed public education in the Rodriguez case because
"the operation of the Texas financing scheme reveal[ed] that the State ha[d] selected means
wholly inappropriate to secure its purported interest in assuring its school districts local control." Id. at 129. This conclusion was premised both on a logical analysis of Texas law where
it was "difficult to find any evidence of. . .dedication [to local control] with respect to fiscal
matters" and on a reference to an empirical study which "showed a direct inverse relationship
between equalized taxable district property wealth and district tax effort with the result that
the property poor districts making the highest tax effort obtained the lowest per pupil yield."
Id. at 127-28. Because Marshall rejected the overly simplistic formalism of applying either
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In one line of argument Marshall advanced a substantive due process/fundamental interest analysis similar to that used by Stewart and
White. 70 Marshall interpreted the eighth amendment as prohibiting
punishment from being more severe than is necessary to serve legitimate
interests of the state.7 ' From his "logical" review of the legal history of
the eighth amendment, he concluded that retribution could not be the
sole end to which capital punishment was linked because the eighth
amendment was "adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance." '72 In so doing Marshall rejected Justice
Stewart's 73 novel utilitarian reformulation of retribution which argued
74
that the death penalty is necessary to avoid anarchy and vigilanteeism.
the rational basis or the strict scrutiny test to all classificatory government action, it does not
mean that he rejected goal-rationality and formalism in the Weberian sense.
Marshall recognized the complexity inherent in his sliding scales approach and confronted the elusiveness imputed to means/ends distinctions. He explicitly rejected criticisms
that "a variable standard of review would give this Court the appearance of a 'super-legislature'" and insisted that "open debate of the bases for the Court's action is essential to the
rationality and consistency of our decision-making process." Id. at 109-10. Marshall's approach required explicitness about which state interest would be served and how the classification would adversely affect the interests of individuals. It would require that the
relationships between the classificatory means and any legitimate state objective be more
substantially demonstrated as the interest of the affected individual became more constitutionally significant.
Marshall also recognized that the proces of determining which interests required more
rigorous review of the means/ends relationships was difficult, but not impossible. "And I
certainly do not accept the view that the process need necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective 'picking and choosing'. . ." Id. at 102. He would use principles of constitutional interpretation to examine the nexus between a specific constitutional guarantee and
the individual's interests involved to determine how substantial the relationship between the
classificatory means and the governmental objective had to be to pass constitutional muster.
In Rodrignez, Marshall found a close nexus between education and free speech and political
participation. Id. at 110-17. Therefore, classificatory schemes involving education deserved
more demanding means/ends analysis than would those addressing commercial activity.
This sliding scale approach requires careful separation of means from ends, first to determine
the balance between individual and state interests, and second to inform about the extent to
which the logical and empirical relationship between classificatory means and governmental
ends had to he demonstrated.
A similarly explicit and complex means/ends analysis is what Marshall displays in
Fumian. While reasonable people may disagree on the relative importance of competing ends
or on the nature of the "true" relationship between means and ends, the approach is more
open, consistent, and goal-rational than are alternatives. As a matter of emphasis, Marshall
demonstrates a formalistic process of specifying ends and means so that any analysis of the
relationship between them can be open and less subject to the personal whims and value
judgments of the justices.
70 Id. at 359 n.141. See also supra text accompanying note 52.
71 Id. at 331-32.
72 Id. at 343.

73 Id. at 308.
74 Radin, supra note 30, at 1054, refers to Stewart's view, later adopted in &egg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, as "revenge-utilitarianism" and notes how the philosophical 'just deserts" rationale of retribution that sees punishment as an end gets unwittingly translated into a
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According to Marshall's fundamental interest analysis, capital punishment had to be reasonably linked to something other than retribution if
it were to stand-the crack in the constitutional footing of capital punishment lies not in the death penalty but in retribution. There was separation of the means of punishment from its goal; he pursued a goal
rational analysis.
That something-more-than-retribution to which capital punishment had to be related according to this fundamental interest approach
was deterrence. 75 Other punishment objectives were quickly dismissed
76
as either inappropriate and/or only marginally secured by executions.
Unless it could be shown that alternatives less burdensome to one's fundamental interest in life (like imprisonment) were less effective than the
death penalty in deterring homicide, the substantial relationship between capital punishment and a permissible government end constitutionally required would not exist. To determine this question (which is
one of relationship and not of values), Marshall conducted a sophisticated review of social science research. 77 This extrinsic evidence did not
establish the required relationship, and so he ruled against capital punishment. The line of analysis separated the means (execution) from the
penal ends (deterrence), utilized goal-rationality, and combined logical
and extrinsic formal rational legal thought.
Marshall also adopted another line of analysis because precedent
contained a second way in which the death penalty might be cruel and
unusual over and above its not bearing a substantial relationship to
permissable goals of punishment. 78 According to eighth amendment
dicta and precedent, modes of punishment like torture or banishment or
capital punishment may become cruel and unusual if evolving standards of decency cause them to shock the conscience or be abhorrant to
current societal values. This logically located legal rule calls for judges
to examine the legitimacy of the kind of punishment itself and so appears
means/end argument more akin to deterrence than retribution. Empirically, it would be
hard to support the proposition that failure to execute would lead to anarchy. Certainly
vigilante justice was more common in an era when capital punishment also was more common. Cf. Bedeau, Testirny before the Subcommittee on Adainistrative Practicesand Proceadureof the
SkateJudiciay Committee, May 11, 1978, IN To ESTABLISH RATIONAL CrITERuA FOR THE
IMPosrroN oF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 35-36 (1978). States that have long been abolitionist
are not more murderous than other jurisdictions, see Zeisel, The Deterent E ect of the Death
.enaly."
Factsv. Faith, 1976 Sup. Or.REV. 317; nor are abolitionist states in great danger of
anarchy. Perhaps this is why Marshall said Stewart and Powell's line of reasoning "defies
belief." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 238.
75 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 345-54.
76 Id. at 355-58.
77 Id. at 345-54, 372, 373. See aLro Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
78 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 360-69.
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to merge value considerations with the means of punishment (value-rationality) and invites value-laden opinions; judges have to discover what
the societal values are. To do this, Marshall performed a goal-rational
analysis where the values were separated from the means by which they
were assessed. He disavowed the legitimacy ofjudges substituting their
own values as reflections of societal standards. 79 Moreover, unlike Justice Burger, 0 he refused to rely on public opinion polls. 8 1 "Rather than
focusing on the surface perceptions of the populace's views. . ., Marshall. . attempted to assess the deeply held principles of the public
. . . [W]hether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends...
on whether people who are fully informed. . . find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. '8 2 As Radin goes on to suggest, Marshall
imposed a minimal requirement of rationality on the data base. To rely
on procedures that assess people's gut reactions-moral positions not
necessarily guided by abstract principles--would be to create a new cell
in Weber's typology (see Figure 1): extrinsic formal irrationality. Arguably, reliance on jury behavior or legislative enactments to learn
about evolving standards would also introduce irrational elements.
Rather than accept values as posited, they too, must be objects of ra83
tional scrutiny according to Marshall.
Because Marshall needed to proceed from informed opinion, the
appropriate data did not exist forcing him to speculate about what an
informed public would accept about capital punishment. 84 He concluded that it would not tolerate "purposeless vengeance. '8 5 Marshall
also reviewed a series of empirical findings that had to be considered if
opinion were to be truly informed on capital punishment: capital punishment is neither a more effective deterrent nor cheaper than life im79 Id. at 369 n.163.
80 Id. at 385-86.
81 Justice White also views public opinion polls as grounds for upholding capital punish-

ment, at least in cases involving mandatory statutes. Se Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at
352-53 nn.5-6.
82 Radin, sfzera note 30, at 1031.
83 CHAMBLIss & SEIDMAN, sufra note 1, might argue that this choice of the appropriate
data source infuses the selection of means to guide decision-making with values. To the extent that the desirability of rationality in legal thought is a value consideration, they would be
correct. Weber, however, may have been little concerned with such an objection as is indicated by his efforts to distinguish between value-and goal-rationality (the latter being the
purer form). From his perspective, rationality which specified means that were linked to the
absolute value of rationality would be required by that value to dearly separate means from
the ends. To the extent that this is tantamount to goal-rationality, it diminishes the role of all
other values in examining the means used to serve legal ends. Accordingly, a Weberian analysis would consider extrinsic formal rationality in assessing the appropriate data base to be
value free for the most part.
84 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 369 n.163.
85 d. at 363.
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prisonment; convicted murderers are seldom executed and are model
prisoners who have comparatively high success rates upon release; innocents are occasionally executed; etc.8 6 His review on research on deterrence was a sophisticated extrinsically formal rational analysis. He
concluded that people's reaction after considering such evidence would
be to oppose the death penalty and so he declared it unconstitutional.8 7A
subsequent test of his hypothesis tended to confirm his speculations.
Overall, then, despite a per se ruling against capital punishment,
Marshall's reasoning reflects complex extrinsically and logically formal
rationality. To analyze this thought illustrates the difficulty but suggests the possibility that even the most troublesome of substantive rulings can be thought through in a relatively value free manner.
Marshall's reasoning illustrates the difference between the substantive
rationality of Brennan's value-rational approach where the analysis was
commingled with the values inherent in "human dignity" and the formal goal-rationality of his own analysis which severed questions of values from the means of analysis even when societal standards were
systematically and rationally explored. His opinion was sufficiently intricate to insist on maintaining rationality when trouble cases force
judges to look beyond the logic of law in case determination. The tension exhibited between extrinsic procedures that are rational (like informed opinion) and those that are frequently irrational (like public
opinion) is perhaps inherent in the high court's position to have to interpret a Constitution that calls on it to protect minority rights from the
potential tyranny of the majority. Of course, this issue of what "facts"
to apply if extrinsic analysis is used requires increased scientific and
methodological sophistication on the part of appellate judges.
C.

IN REVIEW

From this review of official legal thought on capital punishment,
one is struck by how justices announce their decisions using the moral
goal-rational (and less value laden) arguments which typify formal rationality. Eight of the nine judges sought to apply law based on reasoning guided by abstract principles that separated the means of analysis
from the values inherent in the legal ends reached. The four dissenters
and two from the majority (Stewart and White) relied on traditional
arguments to find and interpret the law. Two court members (Douglas
and Marshall) adroitly turned to evidence extrinsic to the logical formality of law and were willing to supplement logical procedures for
86 Id. at 362-69.
87 Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penaly, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the
MarshallHypothesis, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 171, 190 (1976).
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finding law with reasoning premised on data gathered in part by scientific procedures. Procedure and formality were mostly emphasized, but
the nature of rationality, too, was drawn into consideration especially by
Justice Marshall. Weber's basic contention that Western legal thought
is characterized by formal rationality was supported; Chambliss and
Seidman's assertion that there is extensive reliance on empirical data
was not.8 8 Moreover, when empirical data were used, they were not
clearly imbued with value considerations and better fit the goal-rationality of extrinsic formal reasoning than the value-rationality of pragmatic legal realism or substantive rationality. The usefulness of Weber's
typology of legal thought was basically demonstrated.
Just a cursory examination of some of the other controversial decisions in the past years also reveals reliance on formal reasoning through
both legal logic and extrinsic evidence. In Roe v. Wade, 8 9 the majority
used precedent to determine that life (as legally defined) did not begin
at conception. Consequently, state regulations including abortion at
early stages of pregnancy could be offset by countervailing considerations of privacy over reproductive matters-an area highly protected by
previous court decisions.9 It then turned to medical evidence about
when fetal life became viable to establish when the state's interest became nonspeculative enough to begin to regulate the woman's behavior
concerning that new viable life. The ends, protection of human life and
reproductive privacy, were as clearly separated from the challenged
means, laws against abortion, as legal logic and medical science would
allow.
In Miranda v. Arizona91 the majority was confronted with how to
assure the voluntariness and reliability of confessions--already established legal ends. Empirically, they examined interrogation methods
advanced in police manuals and found them to run counter to these
ends so they introduced the Miranda warning and extended the right to
counsel so that means would be less obstructive to ends.
In In re Gault92 the Court noted that the existing juvenile justice
procedures were not obtaining the stated goal of treatment-that the
operative goals of the system were tantamount to punishment. If punishment was the actual end, then due process was the traditional means
by which it had to be pursued.
In all of these cases there was ends/means analysis with the ends
88 The findings reported here comport with what Dorin, supira note 8, also indicated.
89 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90 Griswold v. Connecticut, 384 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535

(1942).
91 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

92 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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being delineated from the means. This allowed consideration of which
means either best contributed to the legally valued ends (as demonstrated empirically) or had been traditionally linked to those ends (as
through case precedent). Capital punishment, then, seems not to be an
isolated example of the analytical utility of Weber's typology. Moreover, if there is value imparted to the process of legal thought, it has less
to do with the private ideologies of the judges than with what was previously or elsewhere adopted in the law. The reasoning process in the
opinions is remarkably value-free even though the outcomes cannot be.
IV.

REASONS FOR FORMALITY, NEUTRALITY,
AND GOAL-RATIONALITY

Weber's rich theoretical legacy also provides a basis for expecting
value neutrality in Western legal thought. After all, ideas were the basis
for social action and there was a general trend toward rationality in the
West. Much of that rationality was evidenced in the structures designated to carry out social action which were organized according to rational-legal principles. Central to these organizational principles were
such features as procedural rules to channel conduct, a stress of training
and expertise as requisites of holding office, and the impersonal, detached performance of the duties of the position. Moreover, rationality
was one means by which authority could be obtained and maintained.
The most obvious feature of organizational rationalization is the
adoption of abstract explicit rules defining how to proceed-almost a
definition of formal rationality in legal thought. Stare decisis, statutory
construction, and principles of constitutional interpretation all serve
that end and were relied on to some extent by all the justices in Furman.
They are the tools of the trade for appellate judges.
Two other features of rational-legal organization also constrain legal thought and direct it toward formality and value neutrality. Demands both for expertise and specialized qualifications among those
who hold office are largely thought to be satisfied by professional legal
training. Consequently, an important part of the socialization ofjudges
that Chambliss and Seidman see as detracting from value-neutrality
may actually enhance it. The blustery admonition of the inveterate,
arrogant Professor Kingsfield of Paper Chase fame for law students to
learn to think like lawyers has become a part of American pop culture.
Although now popularized, the statement is no less accurate. It means
three years of training in case study method to learn inductive law-finding, countless lessons in tedious statutory construction to learn deductive
procedures, and constant reference to constitutional law to master the
bapic constitutional doctrines. It means the near infinite regression of
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the Socratic teaching method to locate the kernels of law and sharpen
logical analysis. It means learning to spot and define issues in strictly
legal terms, extralegal matters being irrelevant. It means learning to
put personal views aside so one can amorally argue all sides of the issue.
It means learning professional norms of zealous but disinterested representation and advocacy regardless of who the client or what the issue.
In short, the modem legal socialization and training that provides eventual judges with the expertise and professional detachment required by
rational organization to hold office also teaches goal-rationality and log93
ically formal reasoning.
Weber also made this point and clearly linked the type of legal
thought with the nature of legal education. Modem legal education in
the universities emphasized "legal theory and 'science'. . . where legal
phenomena are given rational and systematic treatment." 94 "The legal
concepts produced by academic law teaching bear the character of abstract norms, which, at least in principle, are formed and distinguished
from one another by a rigorously formal and logical interpretation of
meaning. Their rational, systematic character (and de-emphasis of content) result in a far-reaching emancipation of legal thinking from the
everyday needs of the public."9 5 It seems that Weber joins Engels9 6 in
seeing a rationality or principled consistency in legal development
which enables law to attain considerable independence from even the
strongest of nonlegal influences. Here are widely diverse conflict formulations that plainly dispute Chambliss and Seidman's emphasis on the
paramountcy of extra-legal inputs.
Value neutrality, formality, and rationality in legal thought probably also arise from another source relevant to both Weber's and Chainbliss and Seidman's analyses. Appellate judges in general, and the
Supreme Court in particular, confront the problem of legitimacy. They
are not elected officials and do not present highly public profiles and so
do not have voter or outside constituencies upon which to rely. Neither
do they have special interest sponsorships that have to be considered to
maintain office. In fact, such commitments (even the mere appearance
of them) may actually disqualify judges from hearing some cases or from
the bench itself. At the same time, judges find themselves deciding
cases---especially "trouble cases"--that potentially affect other govern93 For a recent, and most extensive, empirical and systematic examination of legal socialization of law students, see W. THELENs, THE SOCIALIZATION OF LAW STUDEcrs (1980). ,.e
also Rathjen, 77m Imfat of Legal Education on the Bliefs, Attitudes and Values ofLaw Students, 44
TENN. L. REV. 85 (1976).
94 M. RHNmsTEIN, sufira note 7, at 198.
95
96

Id. at 204-05.
Se supfra text accompanying note 14.
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ment entities in adverse ways even while they depend on the legislature

for money (and jurisdiction in many cases) and upon the executive
branch for enforcement. Indeed, this separation of powers and specialization of functions parallel important features of rational-legal organization. But because of it, courts are in the weakest position of any major
rule-making body to coerce compliance. Consequently, to a large extent
they must rely on persuasion and legitimacy to secure cooperation and
obedience even while finally deciding some of the most controversial
value questions of our time.
Consequently, the organizational situation of appellate courts (one
of Chambliss and Seidman's inputs) 97 constrains toward value neutrality because it is the appearance of value neutrality that helps maintain
legitimacy. Formal rational thought, especially of the goal-rational variety, helps to maintain legitimacy in societies where there is conflict
over values by de-emphasizing values as ratio decidendi and accentuating
process and procedures. Logically formal rationality is based in part on
stare deczsis appeals to tradition, one of Weber's sources of legitimation of
authority. Extrinsically formal rationality can rest on empirical proof
via science, one of Chambliss and Seidman's methods of justification or
legitimation. The recurrent problem of legitimation, then, may provide
a potent explanation for why legal thought seeks to be goal-rational and
proceeds along formally rational lines. This structural constraint combines with organizational demands for legal training and socialization
and formal procedural rules to help shape modern judicial
argumentation.

97 See W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 100-05.

